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James M. Poterba 
The tax treatment of  housing is a central issue of  income tax design. The 
United States tax code, which allows homeowners to deduct mortgage interest 
and property taxes but does not tax their imputed rental income, provides a 
substantial subsidy to owner-occupied housing relative to other consumption 
goods. The Canadian tax code resembles the U.S. code in not taxing imputed 
income, but Canadian taxpayers cannot deduct mortgage interest or property 
tax payments. Both tax systems provide important tax relief on housing capi- 
tal  gains.  Canadian households are not  taxed  on  capital gains on  owner- 
occupied housing, while U.S. households are eligible for a one-time $125,000 
tax exemption. 
This paper presents a framework for analyzing how the tax  and economic 
changes of  the last decade have affected households’ marginal incentives to 
consume owner-occupied housing.  Tax  rules  toward  housing interact with 
other tax provisions such as the level of marginal tax rates, as well as with 
macroeconomic conditions such  as  inflation, to determine the net  cost of 
owner occupation. Two aspects of the tax system are important in this regard. 
The first is the relative tax burden on housing in comparison with other port- 
folio assets. A high burden on housing capital will reduce housing consump- 
tion. The second is the relative tax burden on housing services and other con- 
sumption goods. High excise taxes on other goods will induce households to 
consume housing services. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first describes the basic tax 
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rules that affect owner-occupied housing investment in Canada and the United 
States. In Canada, the tax system has no direct effect on the user cost of home 
ownership for many households.  Rather,  its effects operate through  the bur- 
dens placed  on other  assets and  other goods. The second  section  presents 
background data on the housing markets in the two nations. Broad compari- 
sons of the home ownership rate and the size of the housing capital stock are 
useful,  because  they  shed  light  on the  potential  effects of the  different tax 
rules.  While there is some evidence that the United States is more housing- 
capital-intensive than  Canada, the home ownership rates in the two nations 
are similar. The third section outlines a simple asset-market model of  housing 
investment and consumption, and discusses recent evidence on the applicabil- 
ity of  this  model  to the  housing  market.  The fourth section calibrates this 
model using time series data for each country, and contrasts the resulting pa- 
rameters with those from earlier studies of the United States. The fifth section 
uses this  model  to estimate how housing prices and the demand for owner- 
occupied housing  would respond to the tax and interest rate changes of the 
last decade, assuming  all other factors were held constant.  The concluding 
section notes several important limitations of the simple asset-price model and 
suggests extensions that could address these problems. 
9.1  The Tax Reatment of  Housing: Canada and the United States 
This section begins with a brief summary of the user-cost approach to mea- 
suring housing costs, and then describes the principal tax provisions in both 
nations that affect user costs. It concludes by noting other features of the pol- 
icy environment, principally financial policies, that affect the cost of housing. 
9.1.1 
The user cost of home ownership measures the marginal cost of an incre- 
mental unit of owner-occupied  housing.  It reflects both  cash outlays within 
the year and the foregone return on the owner’s equity. The most convenient 
assumption for computing  the user cost is that property  taxes (TJ,  physical 
decay (a),  and the cost of home maintenance (m)  are all constant fractions of 
house value. In addition, all households are assumed to borrow and lend at a 
pretax  interest rate  i,  to  expect house price appreciation at rate  IT<,  and to 
require a risk premium of CY  to invest in housing. The real purchase price per 
unit of owner-occupied housing is set equal to Po. 
A central issue in modeling the user cost for Canadian households involves 
the tax treatment of returns on alternative assets. These assets determine the 
opportunity cost of investing funds in housing capital. Given the widespread 
availability  of  Registered  Retirement  Saving Plans (RRSPs)  and other tax- 
deferred  saving vehicles,  the benchmark  assumption is that returns on other 
assets are untaxed.  Investors’ after-tax returns equal their before-tax returns. 
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The user cost of owner-occupied housing for a Canadian household is there- 
fore 
(1)  c~,~~~  = [i + T~ + 8 + (Y  + m -  T,]P, 
By subtracting expected house price inflation from the nominal interest cost, 
this expression recognizes that housing capital gains are untaxed. 
Households with constraints on other tax-deferred  saving face a different 
user cost. During  1974-85,  they also derived additional housing incentives 
from a subsidized saving plan, the Registered Homeownership Saving Pro- 
gram (RHSP), that effectively reduced the price of  home purchase for first- 
time home buyers. This program enabled first-time buyers to contribute $1000 
per year, up to a maximum of  $10,000, to an account for use in  financing 
home purchase. For households with unused capacity to contribute to other 
tax-deferred saving accounts, the RHSP program did not affect the user cost 
of housing. For households facing constraints on other tax-deferred contribu- 
tions, however, the RHSP did lower the cost of housing. This program trans- 
formed one dollar of after-tax income into more than one dollar, provided the 
funds were used for house purchase. 
To  evaluate the subsidy, consider a two-person household planning to pur- 
chase a home in k years, that contributed $2,000 ($1,000 per household mem- 
ber) to the RHSP each year. The total value of the household's RHSP account 
k periods hence would be 
(2) 
By comparison, if these funds had been invested in taxable instruments, their 
value in k  periods would have been 
v,,,,  = 2000*[(1 + iy + (1 + iy1  + . . *  + I]. 
(3)  v,,  = 2000*(1 -  0)*[(1 + i(i -  ey 
+ (1 + i(i -  e))-  + . . . + 11. 
Table 9.1 illustrates the magnitude of V,,,,  and V,,  for several values of the 
marginal tax rate, 8, and the number of years until planned house purchase. 
For constrained households, the subsidy is worth several thousand dollars, 
largely because RHSP contributions are made with before-tax dollars. 
The entries in the third row of each panel in table 9.1 suggest that for tax- 
payers facing constraints on their tax-deferred saving contributions, the RHSP 
changes the effective user cost by several percentage points for first-time buy- 
ers, especially late in the subsidy program when buyers could have accumu- 
lated for as long as ten years.'  For a household participating in the program 
and  purchasing a  median-priced house  in  1980, the  subsidy  would  have 
amounted to 7-9  percent of the house value. 
1. The RHSP program, while created to encourage home ownership, could have caused some 
households to  defer first-time buying, in order to  take greater advantage of  the RHSP subsidy. 
Engelhardt (1990)  presents a more complete discussion of RHSPs and their effects. 278  James M. Poterba 
Table 9.1  Incremental Buying Power of Canadian RHSP Accounts 
Number of Years until House Purchase 
3  5  7  9 
~  ~  ~  ~~ 
1  = 10% 
VRHs/  9.3  15.4  22.9  31.9 
A/Median House Price  4.8%  8.4%  13.4%  19.6% 
A  = vRHSP-vrAXa  3.1  5.5  8.7  12.8 
i=7% 
VRHspa  8.9  14.3  20.5  27.6 
A=  vRHSF'-  'TAXa  2.9  4.9  1.3  10.3 
&Median House Price  4.5%  7.5%  11.2%  15.8% 
'Thousands of  dollars. 
Note: Calculations assume a nominal interest rate of  10% (upper panel) or 7% (lower panel), a 
marginal federal tax rate of 21% (corresponding to the  1981 rate for a couple with no children, 
earning  the average taxable  income, $16,254).  and  a provincial  tax  rate of  44%.  for a total 
marginal tax rate of  30.7%.  The household is assumed to be constrained in making further con- 
tributions to other tax-deferred saving vehicles; otherwise the RHSP is worthless. 
For a first-time buyer participating in the RHSP, for whom this program has 
value, the effective price of a house of size H (costing P,*H) is p = [Po*H - 
(V,,,  - V,,)]/P,*H.  Since households for whom RHSPs are valuable have 
also exhausted their tax-exempt investment options, they face an opportunity 
cost of (1 -  e)i on the equity invested in a home. For these households, the 
user cost is: 
(4) c,,~~~  = [i{(l - p)(1 - e) + P)  + T~ + 6 + a + m -  .sr,IP,p., 
where p is the loan-to-value ratio for the house. Note that the after-tax cost of 
mortgage borrowing is still i. 
9.1.2 
The key distinction between the U.S.  and Canadian tax rules is that U.S. 
homeowners  who  itemize  their  deductions can  deduct property  taxes  and 
mortgage interest from their taxable income. For  an  itemizing homeowner, 
the user cost is therefore 
(5)  co,us  = [(l -  O)(i + T,,)  + 6 + cx  + m - 7rTT,IP,. 
The loan-to-value ratio is irrelevant, because the household can deduct interest 
payments, and would be taxable on interest or dividend receipts. 
The average cost of home ownership can differ significantly from the mar- 
ginal cost for some households who forego the standard deduction that they 
would receive if they did not itemize. For taxpayers who would not have item- 
ized without the property tax and mortgage interest deduction, but do itemize 
because of these deductions, the tax saving from home ownership is 6 * (T~  + 
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Table 9.2  Itemization Status of U.S. Homeowners, 1985 
Millions 
Number of Homeowners  56.2 
Number of Homeowners with Mortgages 
Number of Tax Returns with Mortgage Deducation 




Sources; Homeowner information is from Bureau of the Census, Housing  in America, 1985-86, 
Current Housing Report H-121, no. 19. Tax information is drawn from 1985 Srufiisrics oflncome; 
Individual Income Tax Returns. 
i*P)*P,*H  -  S, where H is the quantity of housing and S is the household’s 
standard deduction.  For homeowners who  do not  itemize even  with  their 
housing-related deductions, the marginal user cost is 
This expression is the same as the user cost for Canadian households with 
constraints on tax-exempt saving, but it does not include the RHSP term. 
Table 9.2 presents evidence on the tax status of U.S. homeowners in 1985, 
prior to the Tax Reform Act, which reduced the probability that homeowners 
would choose to itemize. The number of tax returns with itemized property 
tax deductions was only 57% of the total number of owner-occupied proper- 
ties. More than 40% of  the homeowning population therefore faced the non- 
itemizer user cost for housing. In part, the surprisingly small share of home- 
owners who itemized reflects the fact that only 57.3% of homeowners in 1985 
had mortgages. There is a very high rate of home ownership among elderly 
households, many of whom have paid off their mortgages. 
9.1.3  User Cost Comparisons, 1980-1989 
Table 9.3 reports user costs of  home ownership for U.S. and Canadian 
households at several points in the income distribution, in  1980, 1985, and 
1989. The  calculations  consider  families with  adjusted gross  incomes  of 
$25,000,. $50,.000,.  and $250,000, and are based on actual interest rates and 
inflationary expectations (calculated as an  average of  actual inflation values 
for the five prior years). There are differences in the observed long-term inter- 
est rates in  the two nations,  and these are partly reflected in the user-cost 
calculations. The user costs assume the same values of depreciation and main- 
tenance costs and the same risk premium for housing investment in Canada 
and the United States. Marginal tax rates in  each case combine federal and 
state or provincial marginal tax rates.2  The reported user costs are percentages 
ofprice; that is, they are the user costs in earlier equations divided by Po. 
2.  The Canadian calculations assume that each household faces Ontario provincial taxes, as 
well as federal income tax. The U.S.  calculations assume a 6% state income tax on the same base 
as the federal tax. 280  James M. Poterba 
Table  9.3  Homeowner User Costs, United States and Canada, 1980-1989 
1980  1985  1989 
Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S. 
AGI  = $25,000’ 
AGI = $50,000 
AGI = $25O,OOOb 
Marginal Tax Rates 
AGI = $25,000 
AGI  = $50,000 
AGI = $250,000 
Mortgage Rate 
Expected Inflation 
,147  ,103  .133 
,147  .076  ,133 
.147/.094  ,039  .133/.O98 
Background Parameters 
30  23  28 
47  41  37 
62  6  50 
14.3  12.7  11.7 









~  ~~  ~  ~~ 
.I67  .140 
,167  ,125 
1671.134  .119 
26  20 
40  32 
44  37 
12.2  10.1 
4.6  3.6 
Nore: AGIs are in 1989 U.S. dollars. 
‘For a U.S. homeowner in the AGI = $25,000 category who does not itemize, the user costs are ,119, 
,145, and ,152  in 1980, 1985, and 1989 respectively. All other U.S. entries assume that the homeowner 
itemizes and therefore claims the mortgage interest and property tax deductions. 
bThe  two entries for Canada correspond to a taxpayer who is not, and who is, taxed on marginal portfolio 
investments. The calculations assume no RHSP value to the household. 
The calculations in  table 9.3 reflect the various important changes in the 
U.S. and Canadian tax environment during the last de~ade.~  In the United 
States, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 and the Tax  Reform Act of 
1986 lowered personal income tax rates. With a constant pretax interest rate 
at which households borrow and lend, a lowered personal income tax rate 
raises the after-tax cost of  home ownership. In  1980, the weighted-average 
marginal federal tax rate on mortgage interest deductions was 32%. By  1984, 
when the rate reductions of  1981 had taken full effect, this average tax rate 
was 28%. Although data on the post-1986 average are not yet available, it will 
surely be lower than that for previous years. 
The 1986 reform also reduced the fraction of the nonhomeowning popula- 
tion that would itemize. For a joint filer, the standard deduction’s rise from 
$3,670 to $5,000  exerted a negative effect on the incentive to own for house- 
holds in lower and middle income brackets. 
3. None of the reported calculations depend on the household’s loan-to-value ratio. For some 
households, however, this can be a central parameter in the user cost, because there are different 
after-tax costs to borrowing and lending. Some high-income Canadian households face this situa- 
tion.  For the United States, the average loan-to-value ratio for owner-occupied real estate has 
varied between 36% (1978) and 50% (1989). Surveys by Chicago Title Insurance Company sug- 
gest an average down payment as a fraction of sales price of 24% in 1988, with smaller down 
payments (15%) by first-time buyers. Analogous data on loan-to-value ratios are not available for 
Canada. Data from the Canadian Bankers’ Association indicate that 61% of all new mortgages by 
major Canadian chartered banks involve down payments of 25% or more. The debt-to-value ratio 
is higher (the median is more than 90%)  for loans under the National Housing Act. 281  Taxation and Housing Markets 
The largest effects of the 1986 reform were at high tax rates. For a house- 
hold with income of $250,000 and the average deductions for this group, the 
tax reform lowered the federal marginal tax rate from 50% to 33%,  raising the 
user cost (at 1985 interest rates) by 2.3 percentage points when the nominal 
mortgage rate is 11.7% and the property tax rate is 2%. The reform would 
have had to reduce interest rates by nearly three hundred basis points to offset 
this change in the value of the tax deduction. The effect of rate reductions on 
home  ownership  incentives  for  those  in  lower  income  brackets  is  much 
smaller, since the decline in tax rates in the 1986 reform was less pronounced. 
For the household with AGI of $25,000 in  1989, the tax reform lowered the 
federal marginal  tax rate from  16% to  15% and raised  the user cost (in the 
benchmark  case) slightly. Some middle-income  households actually experi- 
enced increases in marginal tax rates as a result of the 1986 reform (see Haus- 
man and Poterba  1987). For those households,  the user cost may even have 
declined. 
Table 9.3 shows that the changes in marginal tax rates in Canada during the 
last decade are less pronounced than those in the United States. A household 
with an adjusted gross income of $50,000, for example, experienced a mar- 
ginal tax rate decline from 47% to 40% during the 1980s. The substantial rise 
in real interest rates during the decade, however, is the principal factor influ- 
encing user costs in Canada.4  Real interest rate movements alter the user cost 
by more in Canada than in the United States, because there is no tax wedge to 
blunt their effects. For most households,  user costs at the end of  the decade 
are estimated to be between two and three hundred basis points above their 
level at the beginning of the decade. 
One implication of the calculations in table 9.3 is that there is less cross- 
sectional variation in housing user costs in Canada than in the United States. 
This is because marginal tax rates play a role in determining the user cost in 
the United States. In addition, most of the Canadian entries in table 9.3  do not 
reflect the sort of  variation that results from itemization status in the United 
States. In 1980, for example, an itemizing homeowner faced a marginal user 
cost of .103, while a first-time buyer with AGI of $25,000 who did not item- 
ize faced a marginal user cost of  .I  19. This is more than three times the level 
of the user cost facing high-tax-rate itemizing households. 
An  important  limitation  of  the  calculations  in  table  9.3 is their  partial- 
equilibrium  nature.  The  1981  and  1986  tax  reforms  in  the  United  States 
changed  the tax  treatment  of  housing,  as well  as of  many  other assets.  In 
particular,  the  1986 reform raised the tax burden on corporate assets while 
bringing tax burdens  on equipment, structures,  and other assets into closer 
alignment.  If tax rates on housing and all other assets rise and capital is in- 
completely mobile internationally,  so that changes in the U.S. system affect 
after-tax returns to U.S. investors, then a tax change of this type should reduce 
4. For some households,  the changes in marginal rates could have influenced user costs, but 
this is not the benchmark case we consider. 282  James M. Poterba 
real after-tax interest rates. The amount of such a decline is crucial for cali- 
brating the actual changes in housing user costs. In  the case of  the United 
States and Canada, differences in the tax treatment of nonhousing assets (e.g., 
the more generous treatment of  capital gains in  Canada) may be  a central 
factor in determining the tax system’s net subsidy to housing. For the bench- 
mark households my  analysis focuses on, virtually all of  the effects of  the 
Canadian tax code must enter through the required return on housing assets. 
General-equilibrium simulations of  the  type  performed  by  Hendershott 
(1987) or Berkovec and Fullerton (1989) are needed to aggregate the different 
tax changes on various assets into the single summary measure-the  change 
in the interest rate-through  which other aspects of tax reform affect the hous- 
ing market. Such models can provide insight into the importance of  differ- 
ences in the taxation of nonhousing assets to the net tax subsidy to housing. 
They are also the only practical way  to handle changes in  the indirect tax 
burdens on nonhousing goods, such as the Canadian Goods and Services Tax, 
which took effect in early 1991. 
9.1.4  Rental User Costs and Tenure Choice 
For  a homeowner with a particular pattern of income and deductions and 
facing a given tax rate, it is straightforward to compute the user cost of owning 
a home. A similar statement applies to the user cost of a rental property. In the 
rental context, the disparities across potential landlords are more controver- 
sial, however, because the law of one price implies that the rental housing 
market must clear at some real rent, and it is not clear which landlord is the 
marginal  supplier of  rental  property.  This conceptual difficulty confounds 
studies of  how  tax  reforms affect the  tenure-choice incentives of  different 
households, as well as tests of how such reforms affect real rent levels. Grav- 
elle (1987) and Poterba (1990) discuss these issues in more detail. 
A complete model of  taxation and housing markets, incorporating the tax 
treatment of rental housing and with endogenous tenure choice, is beyond the 
current modeling exercise, The central role of the tax treatment of rental hous- 
ing has been noted by Clayton (1974) for Canada and by  Titman (1982) for 
the United States. Fallis and Smith (1989) discuss the effects of  the recent 
Canadian changes with respect to rental markets and owner-occupants; Po- 
terba (1990) provides a similar treatment for the United States. 
9.2  Housing in Perspective: US.-Canadian Comparisons 
In standard models of housing demand, the differences in the tax treatment 
of  owner-occupied housing in the United States and Canada should lead to 
different patterns of housing wealth, home ownership, and housing invest- 
ment. This section presents simple summary statistics on each of these issues. 
Table 9.4 shows the share of  owner-occupied capital in the net national 
capital stock, and as a fraction of gross domestic product, for both the United 283  Taxation and Housing Markets 
Table 9.4  Residential Capital Intensity, Canada and the United States, 
1960-1989 







,178  ,264 
.204  ,245 
,228  ,263 







,550  ,598 
.573  ,547 
.686  ,708 








,820  .719 
,808  ,715 
.827  ,710 
,830  .723 
Sources: Board of Governors of  the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheets for the US.  Econ- 
omy, 194.5-89;  Statistics Canada, Flow of  Funds Division, Canadian National Balance Sheers, 
*The total capital stock is the sum of  plants and equipment, residential capital, consumer du- 
rables, and inventories. 
1961-84.  1964-89. 
States and Canada. The data suggest that the United States has traditionally 
been  a more  residential-capital-intensive nation than  Canada.  In  the early 
1960s, more than one-quarter of  the U.S. capital stock was owner-occupied 
housing, while the analogous fraction for Canada was  less than one-fifth. 
There has  been little change,  however,  in  the residential share of  the U.S. 
capital stock during the last three decades, while the Canadian residential cap- 
ital stock has expanded significantly relative to other components of capital. 
At  the end of  1989, the Canadian share was 27.1%, essentially the same as 
the U.S. value. 
The center panel of table 9.4 shows owner-occupied residential capital as a 
share of  current GDP.  Again, the data suggest a higher ratio for the United 
States than for Canada in the 1960s, but with relatively rapid convergence. 
The Canadian owner-occupied capital/GDP ratio was .733 in 1989, above the 
U.S. value of  .632. For the United States, this ratio declined from over 70% 
at the beginning of the 1980s, as real house prices fell. 284  James M. Poterba 
The bottom panel of table 9.4 shows the share of total residential capital 
accounted for by owner-occupied  housing.  In the United States, this fraction 
is slightly greater than 70%, while in Canada, it exceeds 80%. While these 
figures are not necessarily  inconsistent  with the differential  tax treatment of 
owners in the two nations, since rental housing also receives somewhat differ- 
ent treatment, it is not prima facie support for the view that the more generous 
tax treatment of  homeowners in the U.S. has expanded the stock of  owner- 
occupied housing. 
To evaluate the influence of tax policy on home ownership, table 9.5 reports 
the rates of  home ownership, both in aggregate and for particular age groups, 
in  the United  States and Canada during the last two decades. The standard 
claim that the U.S. tax code encourages home ownership receives some sup- 
port in these data, since the U.S. home ownership rate exceeds that of Canada 
in each year.  At young ages, however, the pattern reverses in the  1980s. At 
the beginning of  the 1970s, the home ownership rate for persons under age 35 
was 6 percentage points higher in the United States than in Canada. The com- 
bination of high house prices and interest rates in the United States, and the 
RHSP program  in  Canada, reversed  this pattern  by  1980. In that  year,  the 
home ownership rate for persons under age 35 was 9 percentage points higher 
in Canada than in the United States. The difference has narrowed since then, 
but the home ownership rate for young households  is still higher  in Canada 
than in the United  States. For older households, the higher home ownership 
rate persists in the United States throughout the time period. 
These data are somewhat difficult to reconcile with more standard analyses 
of  the housing subsidy. If the U.S. tax system encourages home ownership as 
much  (relatively)  as the  user costs suggest, then one would  expect  higher 
home ownership rates in the United States than in Canada. The failure of  the 
data to confirm this prediction suggests an important need for further model- 
ing of the housing markets in both countries. 
Figures 9.1 through 9.3 present data on the time-series pattern of three mac- 
roeconomic  features of the housing market in each nation. Figure 9.1 shows 
Table 9.5  Age-Specific Home Ownership Rates, Canada and the United States, 
1973-1988 
1970  1980  I986 
Age Group  Canada  U.S.  Canada  U.S.  Canada  u.s.a 
<35  35.9%  41.6%  56.36  47.5%  42.0%  39.2% 
35-64  70.6  71.8  73.7  78.4  72.7  73.5 
>65  67.1  68.1  63.0  74.1  64.0  75.1 
Total  60.3  63.3  62.  I  68.0  62.1  64.0 
Sources: U.S.: 1970 Census, 1980 and  1987 Annual Housing Survey. Canada: Unpublished data 
provided by  Statistics Canada. 
a1986 U.S. entries correspond to March 1987. 285  Taxation and Housing Markets 
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Fig. 9.2  Indices of real house prices, 1960-89 
the time path of single-family housing starts in the United States and Canada. 
The relatively weak performance of the U.S. market during the late 1980s is 
not matched by a slump in Canadian building. 
Figure 9.2 plots data on real single-family house prices and suggests that 
tax  factors may  have affected house prices  in the United  States. Canadian 
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Fig. 9.3  Indices of real rents, 1960-89 
89 
18% during 1975-80,  Canadian house prices fell by  14%. The 35% decline 
in  real  Canadian house prices during  1975-85,  a period  when  the  “baby 
boom” generation was entering its home-buying years, raises doubts about 
purely demographic explanations for house price changes, such as that pro- 
posed by Mankiw and Weil(l989). 
Finally, figure 9.3 shows the time pattern of real rents. The rent data raise 
puzzles for standard tax analyses of the housing market. In the United States, 
real rents increased by nearly 10% during the early 1980s, at a time when tax 
subsidies were particularly generous toward rental properties. In Canada, the 
real rent series displays an even stranger pattern, with a real decline of more 
than 50% during 1970-89.  Rent control, which was introduced in Canada in 
the mid-l970s, was probably an important factor in this decline. 
9.3  Tax Policy and Housing Markets: An Asset-Price Framework 
The asset-price approach to incidence, which recognizes the short-run fix- 
ity of  various categories of  capital goods, provides a natural framework for 
analyzing how taxation affects the owner-occupied housing market. This ap- 
proach, applied by  Summers (1981) and Poterba (1984) among others, rec- 
ognizes that both the market for housing services and the market for the flow 
of new construction must simultaneously clear. 
If  H(t)  denotes the total stock of housing at time t, and the service flow of 
housing services is proportional to the stock of existing units, then there is a 
market-clearing rental rate R(H(t)),  R’ < 0, at which all rental units will be 287  Taxation and Housing Markets 
held.  In  equilibrium,  this  rental  rate  must  equal the  user  cost of  owner- 
occupied housing services: 
(7) 
For given values of the interest rate, tax parameters, depreciation, and main- 
tenance, this equation can be satisfied either through variation in the real price 
of  houses or through movements in expected rates of  price appreciation. In 
the Canadian context, for example, this equation can be  solved to find  the 
expected real appreciation rate as a function of the current housing stock and 
current house price: 
(8)  E[P,(t + 1) -  Po(t)] = [(l -  9)  i + 6 + m + a 
+ Tp - .rr,IP,(t) -  R(H(0). 
One implication of this equation is that, assuming households have rational 
expectations, the value of real house prices at t can be written as a discounted 
integral of  future  housing  service flows,  net  of  depreciation and  mainte- 
nance costs. The discount rate is the after-tax borrowing rate plus the risk pre- 
mium, a: 
(9)  p,(t) = J  R(H(t + s))  e-"' - e)i + a + 6  + TP  + m - nlsds. 
The flow of new construction is determined by the relative price of houses; 
builders compare this price with the cost of new construction and choose the 





where H(t)  denotes net investment in owner-occupied housing. A steady state 
obtains when net investment is zero.5 
This framework can be used, as in Poterba (1984), to study how various tax 
reforms should affect house prices and the level of  housing investment. For 
example, consider a decline in the marginal tax rate for the housing consumer. 
In  this case housing demand falls,  and the steady-state housing stock con- 
tracts. There is a short-run decline in house prices followed by  a period of 
gradual return to the steady state. Given the model's  saddle-point stability 
property, there is a unique house price at the time of  the shock that will lead 
to the new  steady state. The adjustment dynamics following such a policy 
shock are shown in Figure 9.4. Finding this price decrease is the objective of 
section 9.5. Before considering such experiments, however, the next section 
~(t)  = fi(t) + tiH(t) = ((Po(t)), 
5. In a growing economy, with population growth at rate n and productivity at rate g, the real 
housing capital stock will experience steady-state growth at rate n + A g, where A is the income 
elasticity of housing demand. 288  James M. Poterba 
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Fig. 9.4  Housing market dynamics 
reports estimates of the investment-supply functions for the United States and 
Canada. 
9.4  Calibrating the Housing Investment Function 
To  evaluate the housing market effects of various policies using the forego- 
ing asset-price framework, it is necessary to calibrate the stock-demand equa- 
tion for housing services, as well as the flow-supply equation for new  con- 
struction.  There  are  many  estimates,  based  on  household-level  data,  of 
housing demand; most use U.S. data, but there is some confirmatory evidence 
for  Canada  as  well.  Previous  research  provides  less  guidance  on  the 
investment-supply equation.  After summarizing prior work on housing de- 
mand, this section reports new estimates of housing supply equations for Can- 
ada and the United States. 
9.4.1  Housing Demand Elasticities 
The voluminous literature on  the  demand  for owner-occupied  housing, 
based largely on household data for the United States and summarized in Ro- 
sen (1985) and Olsen (1987.), suggests price elasticities with respect to the 
user cost of approximately -  1  .O. Similar estimates do not appear to be avail- 
able for Canada; therefore, a value of -  1  .O  has been assumed for Canada as 
well. 
In calibrating the asset-price model, I assume a price elasticity of -  1  .O and 
specify a constant-elasticity housing demand function: 289  Taxation and Housing Markets 
(11)  H(t) = C0(t)-f. 
9.4.2  The Flow Supply of New Construction 
The second component of  the housing  market model sketched above is a 
flow supply of new  construction. This relates the level of new construction 
activity to the relative price of  single-family houses. The relative house price 
is the summary statistic for all of the demand-side factors that affect the hous- 
ing market. 
To  facilitate comparisons of  the United  States and Canada, a very simple 
investment-supply equation is used for both nations: 
I, is the level of new single-family housing investment in each nation, and the 
dependent variable is this investment as a share of  GNP, to reflect the alloca- 
tion of  resources between  house building and other activities.  The indepen- 
dent variable is the price of owner-occupied  houses, in each case excluding 
the value of land, relative to the GNP deflator. The latter is a proxy for the 
costs of construction. Because builders may be choosing between construct- 
ing new houses and other types of  building, in some cases this specification is 
augmented with a variable for the real price of nonresidential structures. This 
specification ignores  many factors (e.g.,  the presence  of  credit constraints) 
that have typically been included in models of single-family housing invest- 
ment. It reflects the strict interpretation of the asset-price model. Earlier work 
(Poterba  1984) included additional variables for the United States, and there 
should be future work to apply the same approach to Canadian data. 
Data on house prices  are available beginning  with  1969 for both  Canada 
and the United States. Prior to 1976, the Canadian index is based on a simple 
average of new-house prices (excluding 1and)in six cities. After 1976, the data 
series is more comprehensive. In the United States, the data series on house 
prices is the result of a hedonic procedure for correcting quality change; the 
series reports the price of  a constant-quality house, of the type constructed in 
1982, in each quarter since 1969. For the price of nonresidential  structures, 
we used the GNP deflator for these structures. 
The results  of estimating these equations are reported  in Table 9.6.6 The 
first column for each nation presents ordinary least squares estimates of equa- 
tion (12). For both nations, there is a positive relationship between the level 
of real house prices and the construction of  single-family houses. The link 
appears statistically and substantively more significant in Canada than in the 
United States. The last two columns for each nation report alternative specifi- 
cations of the investment function. Inclusion of  the alternative price variable, 
6.  Treating the national housing market as one, in which builders choose to supply new struc- 
tures based on a single price, neglects the very important regional variation in housing markets. 
In principle,  an investment-supply equation like the one I estimate for the nation could also be 
estimated for specific regions. 290  James M. Poterba 
Table 9.6  Housing Investment Supply Equations, United States and Canada 
United States  Canada 
Estimation 
Method  OLS  OLS  IV  OLS  OLS  IV 
Constant 
Real house price 






1.73  6.40 
(1.20)  (1.92) 
0.53  2.00 
(1.22)  (1.26) 
-  6.42 
(2.13) 
.95  .95 
.90  .91 







-  1.06  5.92 
(0.90)  (1.92) 
2.38  3.54 
(0.78)  (0.65) 
-  8.44 
(2.21) 
.84  .75 
(.06)  (.08) 







Note:  Equations for both countries are estimated for the 1969: 1-1989:4  sample period. Standard errors 
are shown in  parentheses.  See text for further data description.  The instrumental variables estimates 
(column 3) treat the contemporaneous real house price as endogenous and use lagged values of the house 
price as instruments. 
the nonresidential structures deflator, strengthens the positive effect of  real 
house prices in both nations. The last column in each set of estimates recog- 
nizes the potential endogeneity of real house prices in the investment model. 
Since shocks to the investment function affect the growth of the housing stock, 
they affect the future trajectory of real rents and hence current house prices. 
Positive innovations in the supply function reduce real house prices, and vice 
versa. To  address this possibility, the last column in  each case uses lagged 
values of the real house price as instruments for the actual house price, follow- 
ing Fair’s (1970) procedure. This does not  significantly affect the estimated 
coefficients for either country. 
The results are broadly  supportive of  a positive link between investment 
and real house prices. In the United States, a 10% increase in real house prices 
would raise housing investment by between .l%  and .2% of GNP, or approx- 
imately seven billion 1989 dollars. For Canada, the elasticity is even larger; a 
similar-sized relative house price move would lead to an increase of  .3% of 
GNP in single-family housing investment, or nearly a two-billion-dollar in- 
crease (in 1989 Canadian dollars). 
The investment supply equations reported here are not fully articulated in- 
vestment equations for either nation. Nevertheless, they provide a foundation 
for calibrating the asset-price model of the last section and for estimating how 
changes in tax policy might affect house prices. 
9.5  Policy Experiments in the Asset-Price Framework 
The estimated  investment-supply equations can  be  linked  with  demand 
elasticities from the literature to assess how various tax and macroeconomic 291  Taxation and Housing Markets 
changes during the last decade would affect the housing market in the simple 
asset-price framework. To  impose the condition that the steady-state house 
price is constant in the simulations, the investment equations are respecified 
in the form 
IIH = p,  + p,*Po, 
by multiplying through by the average value of GNPIH, approximately 1.6 in 
both the United States and Canada. In steady state, a real house price of  1 
must call forth the level of  replacement investment plus the level needed to 
accommodate economic growth. Housing demand growth of  2% per year is 
assumed, implying that ZIH  = .014 + .02 = .034 (where .014 is the depre- 
ciation rate) in steady state. This requirement, along with the modified value 
of  p, from the foregoing equations, is used to find the respecified investment 
functions: 
(IIH)can= - .014 + .048*P0 (IIH)us 
= ,010  +  .024*P0. 
The  investment equations suggest that  housing investment responds more 
quickly to a given price change in Canada than in the United States. Smaller 
price increases are thus implied in response to  favorable policy shocks in 
Canada. 
Table 9.7 reports simulation results for housing market responses to three 
sets of policy shocks: a shift in the United States from 1980 or 1985 tax rates 
to  1989 values, holding constant all macroeconomic factors; a shift in the 
United States from 1980 or 1985 inflation rates to  1989 values, holding the 
real interest rate and tax parameters constant; and an increase in the Canadian 
retail sales tax by  5 percentage points on all nonhousing goods. The results 
focus on the user-cost effects for a homeowner with an AGI of $50,000; dif- 
ferent calculations would obtain for the other example households considered 
above. 
Although each of the first two reforms has a substantial effect on the U.S. 
housing market, neither affects the Canadian market because neither marginal 
tax rates nor the inflation rate enter the benchmark user cost calculation. The 
first panel of table 9.7 shows the effects of the tax rate changes in the United 
States. The long-run reduction in housing demand from falling marginal tax 
rates is calculated at 17.1% since 1980. This figure reflects the large change 
in marginal rates in the United States and the important interaction between 
marginal  rates  and  housing user costs because interest payments  are tax- 
deductible. 
The second panel of table 9.7 considers the effects of inflation shocks. The 
U.S. user cost of home ownership is sensitive to the inflation rate, while the 
Canadian user cost is not, at least for households that are not taxed on mar- 
ginal portfolio investments. Assuming that expected inflation in the United 292  James M. Poterba 
Table 9.7  Housing Market Reactions to Tax and Economic Changes 
1980  1985 
Shi) to 1989 Tax Rates (US.) 
Base Case Tax Rate 
Hypothetical Tax Rate 
Base Case User Cost 
Hypothetical User Cost 
Long-run Housing Demand 
Short-run House Price Change 
Ship to 1989 Injation Rate (US.) 
Base Case Inflation Rate 
Hypothetical Inflation Rate 
Base Case User Cost 
Hypothetical User Cost 
Long-run Housing Demand 
Short-run House Price Change 
Shifi to Higher Retail Sales Tax (Canada) 
Base Case User Cost 
Hypothetical User Cost 
Long-run Housing Demand 











-  ,303 
-  ,237 
,147 
,140 












-  .050 
-  .038 
,133 
.126 
+  ,050 
+ ,032 
Note:  Estimates are based on change in user costs for households with 1989 AGI of  $50,000; the 
underlying user costs are reported in table 9.3. The simulation algorithm employs the investment- 
supply models in equation (14) and finds the perfect-foresight price change associated with each 
policy. 
States declined by more than 5% between 1980 and  1989, and holding other 
factors fixed,  the  asset-price model  suggests that  the demand for  owner- 
occupied housing by the stylized person in table 9.7 should have been reduced 
by nearly 30 percent. 
The final policy experiment, shown in  the bottom panel of  table 9.7, is 
confined to Canada. This is an increase of  5 percentage points in  the retail 
sales tax on all goods except housing services. Assume that the revenue effects 
of the tax are offset with lump-sum transfers. This policy raises the demand 
for housing by 5% in the long run, and in the short run it increases the demand 
for housing by 3.2%. By comparison, a similar-sized shock to long-run hous- 
ing demand would raise U.S.  house prices by  3.8%, because of  the lower 
elasticity of housing supply. 
9.6  Conclusions 
This paper has only begun to exploit the rich research opportunities for tax 
economists presented by  the U.S. and Canadian housing markets. Although 
the nations are similar in many ways, the tax treatment of both housing and 
nonhousing assets varies substantially, and the timing of  tax changes toward 
rental and owner-occupied housing differs between nations. A set of  natural 293  Taxation and Housing Markets 
experiments is thus provided for assessing whether housing demand is sensi- 
tive to tax parameters,  how user costs affect tenure choice, and how macro- 
economic  factors operate through  disparate tax  codes to affect the housing 
market. 
Future research  could  focus on how  the  RHSP program has affected the 
housing market in Canada, how the differential tax subsidies to rental proper- 
ties have affected rents, and how the divergent patterns of real price and real 
rent movements  in the two countries  are related  to tax considerations.  The 
findings  should  provide  substantial  input  for  calibrating  more  complete 
general-equilibrium  models  that  endogenize  tenure  choice,  as  well  as the 
quantity of housing consumed (see Goulder and Summers 1989). 
Another research priority should be the modeling of housing markets at a 
more disaggregate level. My analysis focuses on the aggregate level of hous- 
ing  investment,  neglecting  the  important  variation  across  metropolitan 
housing  markets.  One possible  topic  for case-study  analysis  is:  How  does 
the housing  market  in a pair of  similar U.S. and Canadian cities compare? 
Regional variation in income growth, tax rates, and other factors should also 
prove useful in studying more general questions of housing market dynamics. 
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